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A salient influence in Plato's life was that he experienced a series of
political crises.' He saw his native Athens, the proud seat of a great em-
pire, humbled and all but destroyed. He witnessed violent class conflict in
which his relatives and friends, members of the reactionary Thirty Ty-
rants, indulged in such brutal persecution that conventional participation
in politics became repulsive. Complete disillusionment set in when that
harsh regime was succeeded by a disorderly "democracy" which put to
death "the best man" in Athens, his beloved idol, Socrates.2 Plato's vast
energies and ambitions sought deeper, more satisfying expression than
political leadership could provide. The most important practical result
was his Academy where many future leaders were trained in legislation
and the drafting of legal codes.' The enduring product, which has lived
for almost 2500 years as the most brilliant achievement in the entire his-
tory of human thought, is the philosophy of Plato, which laid the foun-
dation of political theory and jurisprudence.4
Law is the central, unifying subject of Plato's philosophy;' and
Plato's attitude towards law in the early dialogues is vigorously affirmed.
In the Apology Socrates reports two historic instances when, at great
peril to himself, he insisted on adherence to the law. In the trial of cer-
" Professor of Law, Indiana University. The writer acknowledges with thanks a
grant by the Graduate School of Indiana University for research assistance. The writer
also acknowledges the valuable assistance of Irving Wasserman, Graduate Student in
Philosophy, Indiana University.
1. See Boas, Fact and Legend in the Biography of Plato, LVII PiImoS. REv. 439
(1948).
2. Plato, Ep. VII, 325a-326a.
3. PLuTARCH, MoRALs, v. 32, 381-82 (Goodwin ed., 1878).
4. "One of the studies most ardently pursued in the Academy was Jurisprudence,
of which he [Plato] is the real founder." BURNET, ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 224 (1930).
5. "[T]he problem of law, its source, criterion, and aim, is at the very heart of
Plato's philosophy. . . ." Maguire, Plato's Theory of Natural Law, X YALE CLASSICAL
STUDIES 151, 152 (1947).
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tain generals for not recovering the bodies of dead soldiers (which made
it impossible to perform the customary religious rites) Socrates was the
only judge "who was opposed to the illegality" of trying the officers.
The trial, he said, was "contrary to law." (Apol. 32b). And when, in the
reign of the Thirty Tyrants, he was ordered to arrest Leon of Salamis,
Socrates refused to obey, though he courted death in doing so. By posi-
tivist criteria the Tyrants were Sovereign and theiriorders were law. But
Socrates said: "This was a specimen of the sort of commands [note he
did not say "law"] which they were always giving .... [T]he strong
arm of that oppressive power did not frighten me into doing wrong."
(Apol. 32cd). After his own conviction Socrates severely criticized the
"unjust judgment" (Apol. 41b), and this has been interpreted as opposi-
tion to law. But Socrates' criticism of the decision and of unjust judg-
ments must be set against his uniform praise of a.w and his conspicuous
conformity to law in the most trying circumstances.
The distinction between law and the administration of law, between
law and the verdict, law and the decision or judgment, provides the prin-
cipal clue to the thesis of Crito. Neither there nor in the Apology does
Socrates criticize the law on irreligion or the law on corruption of the
youth or any other law. On the contrary, Socrates affirms that he "might
justly be arraigned in court" if he denied the existence of the gods.6 The
least implication of Socrates' remarks in the Apology is his approval of
Athenian law.7 And in the Crito we read a eulogy of law which removes
any doubt regarding Plato's attitude as expressed in these early dialogues.
This is dramatized in a vivid personification of the laws whose final
words summarize the meaning of Crito: "Now you depart in innocence
a victim, not of the laws but of men."'8 The distinction between the
decision or judgment and the law governing the case was not original with
Plato. Indeed, in fourth century Athens it was to be expected, for there
was no system of legal precedent despite a pleader's reference to recent
trials.9 "Law," for the Athenians, meant primarily the codes of Draco,
Solon, and Cleisthenes, revised and amended.'"
6. Apol. 29a. Certain cases of impiety were made capital offenses by Plato in Laws
910cd. The quotations from the dialogues are from Jowett's translation (1892) unless
otherwise specified.
7. Cf. "The men who condemned Socrates . . . were dimly aware that Socrates'
mission pointed to a subversion of all existing institutions." CORNFORD, THE UNWRITTEN
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 60 (1950). Cf. "Far from being in conflict with the
institutions of laws and morals, Socrates is rather the one who undertook to prove their
reasonableness and thereby their claim to universal 'validity." WINDELBAND, HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY 81 (Tufts transl. 1926).
8. Crito 54bc. (Italics added.)
9. Dorjahn, Legal Precedent in Athenian Courts, VII PHILoL. QUART. 375 (1928).
10. See note 45 infra.
PLATO'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
The gist of Socrates' position comes then to this: Athenian law is
right law. But the specific application of such law to human affairs, the
administration of law, the decisions and sentences are sometimes errone-
ous and, therefore, unjust. But since laws can be applied only in particular
decisions, those judgments must be obeyed even if they are unjust. Any
other view leads to anarchy. Here, in Plato's separation of law from de-
cisions is the origin of the theory, rejected in recent thinking, though
not without important modern support,1 that law exists apart from spe-
cific decisions, indeed, that law pre-exists in complete sufficiency.
Had Plato been content to rest his views on the common sense level
exemplified in the early dialogues, there would have been no cavalier dis-
missals of his philosophy by modern scholars. But when the philosopher
emerges from his early period of affirmation and common sense proof
to engage in metaphysical inquiries, his speculation becomes, for many
modern thinkers, incomprehensible, distasteful, and even dangerous.
To analyze Plato's legal philosophy adequately, one must consider
the questions which engaged his most imaginative efforts and ask why
he pursued his inquiries into the airy realms of metaphysics and whether
other philosophers have provided sounder answers. Everyone agrees that
science is important and this implies the existence of a certain kind of
knowledge. But what is knowledge, and can there be any knowledge
without ideas? Almost everyone agrees that communication is a fact,
and this implies that many persons know "the same things." But how is
communication possible? What is there in the world or in the brains or
minds of men that permits common understanding to exist? How explain
the complex structures of modern science and the uniform responses of
scientists to them?
11. Cf. "Having said this much concerning law in the abstract, and concerning its
silent and unobtrusive benefactions, we shall not shrink from a consideration of the law
as it manifests itself in its administration. Here we shall admit, as indeed we have done
already, that doubts, difficulties and uncertainties come in, and that sometimes the in-
strumentalities of the law become the subject of just reproach. It does not follow, how-
ever, that the law itself is subject to reproach. However certain, positive and clear the
law may be, it must of necessity, for administration, be committed to agencies and sub-
jected to influences that lack all these qualities, and are at once unmanageable and doubt-
ful. The law has then to deal with uncertain facts, with untrustworthy or mistaken
witnesses, with obscure or false documents, with ignorant or prejudiced jurors, with
fallible judges; in short, the law for construction and application is then delivered over
to fallible human beings, sometimes under circumstances when it would seem that noth-
ing short of Supreme Wisdom could possibly determine what ought to be the proper
conclusion." Cooley, The Uncertainty of the Law, Fourth Annual Mtg. Report, Ga. Bar
Assn. 122, Aug. 3 and 4, 1887 (pub. 1888).
"Decisions of the courts are not the law; they are the evidence of the law. Where
decisions correctly present the law they should be followed and if they do not correctly
present the law they should not be followed." I re Bair, 49 F.Supp. 59-60 (M.D. Pa.
1943).
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A principal obstacle to the solution of these problems in Ancient
Greece was the positivistic bias of the sophisticates of Plato's day. These
"real aborigines . . .obstinately asserted that nothing is which they are
not able to squeeze in their hands."" They "will not allow that action or
generation or anything invisible canhave real existence." (Theaet. 155e).
To be sure, acknowledged Plato, "without bones and muscles . . . I can-
not execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them
.. .and not from the choice of the best . . . . [shows] that they can-
not distinguish the cause from the condition. . . ." (Phaedo 99b).
Related to these "uninitiated" ones were the extreme relativists who,
applying their dogma to law, asserted that what is just, honorable, or holy
varies from state to state, i.e., they are merely "such as the state thinks
and makes lawful .... " (Theaet. 172a). There is nothing "in nature"
that determines the quality of these things. "[T] he standard of morals
varies, and what is honourable to some men is dishonourable to others."
(Eryx. 400c). At most, it is merely a matter of agreement, convention. 3
Nonetheless, observes Plato, "the followers of Protagoras will not deny
that in determining what is or is not expedient for the community one
state is wiser and one counsellor better than another-they will scarcely
venture to maintain, that what a city enacts in the belief that it is ex-
pedient will always be really expedient." (Theaet. 172a, 177cd). But
this implies standards of appraisal and decisions that are defensible on
rational grounds. Thus was the issue joined. It ultimately involved the
relevance and validity of metaphysics, and its ramifications were unified,
as will appear, in the significance of positive law.
In opposition to the current positivism, Plato sought to establish the
necessity of "the intellectual principle which . . . can be attained only by
philosophy . . . ." (Phaedo 81b). Since the senses cannot apprehend
what things "have in common" (Theaet. 185b), Plato insisted that that
and other "immaterial things . . . are shown only in thought and idea,
and in no other way. . . ." (States. 286a). Plato tried to discover
"what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal and incor-
poreal, and which they [people] have in their mind's eye .... " (Soph.
247d). In more prosaic language, what is involved in relationships, e.g.,
of cause and effect, equal or unequal, opposites, correlatives, parent-child,
12. Soph. 247d. They believe "that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a
man may touch and see and taste. . . ." (Plaedo 81b).
13. "Each man was strong only in the conviction that nothing was secure .
THIUcYDIDES, Book iii, 83 (Jowett trans]. 1881).
PLATO'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
and so on? What of order, structure, system, regularity, law ?"4 Surely,
these terms do not represent mere sounds or physical things? Equally
certain is it that in some way they "exist." Yet these "things" obviously
are not tangible, nor do they exist in space. Plato held that they are
incorporeal entities, "forms" or "ideas," which are apprehended in mental
processes. He laid the enduring foundation of external, real ideas and
ideals-a value cosmos-and thus, as will appear, of traditional natural
law philosophy. The journey from his initial insight concerning ideas to
the metaphysics of his mature, most creative period was a long one. In
the course of pursuing it Plato formulated problems and developed theo-
ries which have become the perennial issues of jurisprudence and political
science.
The central thesis of his philosophy of law is expressed in the Re-
public and Laws, or, more precisely, in the interrelations of these great
dialogues which, together, comprise the greater part of his published
works. The principal difficulty which bars the way of assured interpre-
tation is the uncertainty and divergence of critical opinion regarding the
Republic. It is necessary to understand the purpose of that dialogue if
the significance of Plato's philosophy of law is to be appreciated.
Republic
An obvious characterization is that the Republic is a philosophical
discussion of justice; indeed, the sub-title of the dialogue is "Concerning
Justice."1 Plato says, "we are seeking for justice .... "16 He proposes
"that we enquire into the nature of justice and injustice, first as they
appear in the state, and secondly in the individual, proceeding from the
greater to the lesser and comparing them." (369a). A more definite
clue is given when Plato suggests, "now let us build up our imaginary
state from the beginning."'" He characterizes this state as "a city of the
blessed" (458e), "the perfect State" (502d), and he contrasts it with
"the present evil state of governments" (492e)-"not one of them is
worthy of the philosophic nature." (497b).
14. Plato also raised the following questions: "first, that nothing can become
greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself-you
would agree? . . . secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or
diminution of anything, but only equality." (Theaet. 155a).
15. Barker translates the title 'polity, or concerning righteousness.' POLITICS OF
AISTOTLt 362 (Barker transl. 1946).
16. Rep. 336e. Some quotations from the Republic are from Jowett's translation;
others are from Cornford's translation (1945) and will be cited as such.
17. Cornford, 369c. (Italics added.)
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Despite these and many similar statements by the author of the
Republic,"5 the principal function of the dialogue has not been thoroughly
grasped. For example, it is often said that the Republic is a "Utopia."
But Plato, conceding that "the perfect State . . . was difficult of attain-
ment . . ." (502d) and that he cannot prove that it will be "actually
founded" (Cornford, 472e), insists repeatedly that it "is not impossible"
(502c), that his "scheme . . . has not been a mere day-dream . .. .
(Cornford, 540d). Thus, on the one hand, Plato was not describing any
existing state nor, on the other hand, was he indulging in merely wish-
ful thinking.
Nettleship, whose Lectures have influenced many students of "the
subject of the book,"' 9 observes that although the title suggests politi-
cal philosophy, "it is rather a book of moral philosophy." "It is a book
about human life and the human soul or human nature, and the real
question in it is, as Plato says, how to live best." That, for Plato, is
"inseparable from the question, What is the best order or organization of
human society ?""2 All of this is both relevant and valid, but it does not
reveal the distinctive function of the Republic. Moreover, the connota-
tion of some of Nettleship's text is anthropocentric rather than realistic
in Plato's sense. For example, "the whole Republic . . . is really an at-
tempt to interpret human nature psychologically . . . . " This has misled
subsequent investigators.
Thus, Jaeger, acknowledging his debt to Nettleship, finds that "the
ultimate interest of Plato's Republic is the human soul.' 2 A Kantian
perspective is indicated in the assertion that, "what the philosopher calls
justice must be based on the most inward nature of the human spirit.""
In general, Jaeger amplifies Rousseau's interpretation that "the Republic
is not a work on politics but the finest treatise on education that was ever
written.""2
18. "We were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character
of the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an
ideal." (Rep. 472c). Plato sometimes states his purpose even more specifically: "[W]e
have been constructing in discourse the pattern of an ideal state." (Cornford, 472e)
(Italics added.)
19. NETTLESHiP, LECTURES ON THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 4 (1898).
20. Id. at 4, 5.
21. Id. at 68. In fairness to Nettleship it should be added that his discussion of
Plato's forms (Id. at 191-96) and of "the Good" is very helpful. Unfortunately he did
not organize his work (it was published from students' notes), and his successors have
not been much influenced by his philosophical discussion of the ideas.
22. II JAEGER, PAIDEIA 199 (Highet transl. 1945).
23. Id. at 202.
24. Says Jaeger, "the positive exposition of the Platonic system of education is the
real theme of the work." Id. at 204. Cf. "The Platonic state was accordingly to be an
institution for the education of society." WINDELBAND, HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSO-
PnY 213 (Cushman transl. 1910).
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Barker, while recognizing that the Republic is an "ideal" which must
be contrasted with a utopian "city in the clouds,""3 and noting that the
dialogue includes treatises on metaphysics, moral philosophy, education,
political science, and philosophy of history, concludes that "the question
which Plato set himself to answer was simply this: What is a good man,
and how is a good man made? ' ' "- Finally, Mcflwain, who explicitly adopts
Nettleship's interpretation, asserts that the Republic does not delineate
an ideal state, but "is a search for the fundamental principles 6f all hu-
man conduct. . . .
With deference to the judgment of these distinguished scholars, it is
submitted that their interpretations do not sufficiently take account of
the distinctive purpose of the dialogue."5 Among the few philosophers
who have fully recognized this is Sabine. Sabine discovered the distinc-
tiveness of the Republic in its delineation of a "type or model of all
states. 2  "He was trying to show what in principle a state must be
... ,,3o Even more significant is Sabine's observation that the "idealized
figures" of the mathematicians and "the astronomer's types" suggested
the model of Plato's Republic."'
What are the characteristics and functions of such an "ideal con-
struct"? First, it is sufficiently within the reach of human competence
to be attainable to a significant degree (499d, 5 02c, 540d). Second is
its relation to existing facts; for example, the actual Spartan state influ-
enced Plato's scheme. And the third characteristic of a model or ideal
construct inheres in its transcendence of actuality. 2 While the phil-
osopher is immersed in his culture, he also transcends it when he presents
his model-for the ideal cannot be fully explained by, it does not stand
in a merely causal relation to, the contemporary culture. A point by point
comparison of the model with all the existing states known to Plato
25. BARKER, GREEK POLITIcAL THEORY 239 (1918).
26. Id. at 146.
27. McILWAIN, THE GROWTH OF POLITIcAl. THOUGHT IN THE NWEST 33 (1932).
28. LINDSAY, REPUBLIC, Introduction x (1940); HOERER, THE THEmE OF PLATO'S
REPUBLIC 3 (1944).
In his earlier work, Barker said that the Republic "attempts to show . . . what
would be the manner of a State, in which the Idea of the Good had found its perfect
expression." BARKER, POLITICAL THOUGHT OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 4-5 (1906).
29. SABINE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 46 (1950).
30. Ibid.
31. "In the same manner the Republic aims not to describe states but to find what
is essential or typical in them. . . . The line of thought is substantially similar to that
which caused Herbert Spencer to argue for a deductive 'Absolute Ethics,' applying to
the perfectly adapted man in the completely evolved society, as an ideal standard of
reference for descriptive social studies." Id. at 48; cites Data of Ethics, ch. XV.
32. "The whole of the Republic is an excursion into an ideal realm where change
and imperfection do not exist." STENZEL, PLATO'S METHOD OF DIALECTIC X (1940).
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would disclose the precise gaps between description and transcendence.
An "ideal construct" or "model" is thus an exaggeration of certain facts.
It is also an instrument for description, comparison, and evaluation of
institutions.3" In sum, the Republic is the delineation of such an ideal
construct."
To appreciate the meaning and function of the Republic, as such a
model or construct, one needs to consider it in relation to certain other
dialogues, especially Laws. Since positive law is the principal subject of
Laws, the question concerns the relation of the ideal of the Republic to
positive law. However, before that basic problem can be analyzed, it is
necessary to discover Plato's position regarding the "rule of law," and
specifically, to consider with reference to that, the prevailing interpreta-
tion as expressed by Barker, Mcllwain, and Sabine.
After emphasizing the Greeks' veneration of their law,3" Barker
states: "There is one Greek thinker, Plato, who departs from the Greek
conception of the sovereignty of law. In the Crito, indeed, and again in
the Laws, he follows that conception; but in the Republic and the Politicus
[Statesman] he specifically rejects the sovereignty of the law."3  This
is the thesis which Barker advances throughout his book. 7 The gist of
his argument is that there is a fundamental opposition between the Re-
public and Statesman, on the one side, and Crito and Laws, on the other.
concerning "the sovereignty of the law."3 "
The first question is, did Plato "reject the sovereignty of the law"
in the Republic? Was he there "a rebel against the rule of law" ? At the
outset, it must be granted that Barker's stand is a very bold one. To hold
that Plato in this extremely important work was hostile to law, that he
rebelled against and rejected the sovereignty of law, is to say that Plato
33. Hempel, Problems of Concept and Theory Formzation in the Social Sciences, in
SCIENCE, LANGUAGE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 65 (1952).
34. "[Our purpose was to use them as ideal patterns." (Rep. 472c). A recent
writer in a book seen after the above was written characterizes the Republic as "a toy
model," a "model state," a "mechanical toy model," an "engineer's model." GRE.NE,
MAN IN His PRIDE 155-57, 191 (1950).
35. Barker quotes Wilamowitz: "All morality, not only civic, but also human-all
the benefits of civilisation-appear as the gifts of the law, which the society recognizes
as its lord." BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY 38.
36. Id. at 39.
37. Barker reiterated his interpretation recently in his Introduction to his transla-
tion of the POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, op. cit. supra note 15 at liv.
38. BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY 39-40. Barker even doubts "whether Plato
ever really returned within the limits of the law. . . . The end of the Laws seem to in-
dicate that to the very last he was still a rebel against the rule of law, and still an advo-
cate of the rule of free intelligence. On the other hand it should be added that in the
Politicus he does not absolutely reject the rule of law. He admits that, under certain
conditions, it may be a 'second best'." Id. at 40 n. 1.
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there opposed the Greek tradition of legality and repudiated the principal
achievement of the Athenian polity.39
An obvious challenge to Barker's interpretation is simply to point
to many statements in the Republic in praise of law. This is implied
in the criticism of politically incompetent persons "who make only a
vain show of being guardians of the laws and of the commonwealth
. . ." (Cornford, 421a). Plato extols "a law-giver worthy of the
name" (Cornford, 427a), for "many states, great and small, have owed
much to a good law-giver, such as Lycurgus at Sparta, Charondas in
Italy and Sicily, and our own Solon." (Cornford, 599de). He holds
that "the law is not concerned to make any one class especially happy,
but to ensure the welfare of the commonwealth as a whole. By persuasion
or constraint it will unite the citizens in harmony. . . ." (Cornford,
519e). He wishes to control the play of children lest they "never grow
into law-abiding and well-conducted men," and he seeks to instill in them
"reverence for law" (Cornford, 424e-425a). His most severe criticism
of degenerate democracy is that the citizens "end by disregarding even
the law, written or unwritten." (Cornford, 563d). And he holds that
"conduct has come to be approved or disapproved by law and custom
... . according as conduct tends to subdue the brutish parts of our
nature to the human-perhaps I should rather say the divine in us .... "
(Cornford, 589d). Are these the expressions of a man who had an "aver-
sion" to law4" and "rebelled against" and "absolutely rejected" the rule
of law?
But the interpretation of a distinguished political theorist undoubt-
edly rests on substantial evidence; and, indeed, there are many statements
in the Republic which seem to support Barker's position. Expressed in
many of the dialogues4 is Plato's scathing criticism of courts and law-
yers, of "those tricks of special pleading in the law-court" (Corn-
ford, 499a) and "the scurrilous battle of words that goes on in the As-
sembly and the law-courts. . . ." (Cornford, 549d). Indeed, Plato
anticipated practically all of the subsequent criticism of the lawyer's role,
the adversary method of trial, and the evils of litigation.42 But what
does Plato's criticism of lawyers and courts signify? It is only necessary
39. Id. at 271.
40. Id. at 203.
41. Laches 196b; Euthyd. 273c; Gorg. 471e-472a; Phaedrus 272e; Theaet. 172c,
173a, 175cd; Laws 743c, 937e-938a.
42. It should be remembered, however, that Greek procedure was informal, with-
out guidance or control by any professoinal judge, and that the jurors (judges) con-
sisted of several hundred laymen. The situation was an open invitation to indulge in all
the tricks of rhetoric which Plato abhorred.
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to recall that in Crito Plato distinguished law from judgments and ad-
ministration, to realize that his criticism of courts and lawyers was not
criticism of law.
One must, however, take account of the important passage heavily
relied on by Barker, viz. "about . . . the ordinary dealings between man
and man . . . about insult and injury," Plato will not "condescend to
legislate." (425cd). The context of this passage is in the opening pages
of Book Four. Plato has been discussing a number of important prin-
ciples of legislation (417b), and, just preceding this passage, unlimited
license in music is criticized because it undermines "laws and constitu-
tions." (424e). Then the point is made that properly educated youth
will themselves invent "lesser rules." Socrates specifies that these rules
will be confined to such matters as when to be silent before elders, how
to show respect for them, how to honor parents, what clothes to wear, in
short, "deportment and manners in general." (425b). These are matters
which the most rigorous modern Rechtsstaats omit from their legislation
because they are unimportant or are not amenable to legal control. 3
Thus, the context of this important passage does not support the claim
that the passage expresses opposition to the rule of law.
The passage itself and its relation to Laws must be more fully ex-
amined. The complete statement is:
Well, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary
dealings between man and man, or again about agreements with
artisans; about insult and injury, or the commencement of
actions, and the appointments of juries, what would you say?
there may also arise questions about any impositions and ex-
actions of market and harbour dues which may be required,
and in general about the regulations of markets, police, har-
bours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall we condescend to
legislate on any of these particulars?
I think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about
them on good men; what regulations are necessary they will
find out soon enough for themselves.
Yes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them
the laws which we have given them. (425cd).
What must be said about this passage in its fuller implications may
be summarized as follows:
43. Cf. Nettleship, op. cit. supra note 19, at 141-42; and Pound, Limits of Effective
Legal Action, XXVII ETHICS 150 (1917) ; 3 A.B.A.J. 55 (1917).
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(1) As noted, just preceding this passage, Socrates had suggested
the desirability of legislation to implement various principles; hence the
sweeping inference drawn by Barker is not warranted.
(2) The passage includes no reference to those problems which Plato
regarded as the most important ones, e.g., religion, education, the family,
and criminal behavior, all of which are made the subjects of considerable
legislation in Laws. These very significant omissions, together with the
fact that the passage closely followed the discussion of "lesser rules,"
indicate that Plato was still discussing minor matters.
(3) The passage does refer to personal injury and to certain con-
tracts, and these are important. In Laws Plato states that properly edu-
cated citizens will be able to provide the necessary legislation themselves
(Laws 846c), and that dialogue does include considerable legislation on
these matters.44 All of this indicates that Plato omitted in the Republic
to legislate regarding them not because he was then opposed to the rule
of law, but because actual legislation was not a necessary or even a co-
herent part of his "model," that is, a theory of legislation, an analysis of
principles.
(4) The passage emphasizes "regulations"-that is the term Plato
uses-rather than "law" which, for Plato, signified legal codes.4  And
Plato concludes the passage by asking, "shall we condescend to legislate
on any of these particulars?"' "a The last phrase, as well as the other ref-
erences to regulations, reinforces the view that Plato was here primarily
concerned with problems of administration."' Thus, in sum, the above
passage does not reveal any opposition by Plato to the rule of law.
A third direction to be taken in appraising Barker's thesis is found
in the passages eulogizing education, where Plato asserts that it supplants
the need for law. As Barker states, "there it was argued that when edu-
cation has given a living knowledge, law has become unnecessary....
44. In Laws there is legislation for assault and battery (882), for breach of con-
tract (920-921), and for regulation of retail trade (917d-918c), coins, measures, and
weights (746e-747a). But even in Laws manners are excluded from legal control (730b)
and petty matters are also ignored since the habit of violating the law "in small mat-
ters" would undermine respect for law (788b).
45. The Greeks also distinguished laws from decrees. Sophocles, Antigoie 450-
460; PERROT, DROIT PUBLIQUE D'ATrHNES 175-79 (1867).
46. Italics added.
47. Aristotle's comments on the Republic support the above interpretation. Thus,
that Plato in the above passage was referring to regulations, and not to law, as then
understood, see PoLirrcs OF ARISTOTLE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1264a § 21. Aristotle
also notes that the Republic "fails to throw any light on other questions . . . such as
. . . the character of the laws they [the farmers] are to observe." Id. 1264a § 23. This
implies that Aristotle did not interpret the Republic as a rejection of law, but only as
omitting to deal with legislation. Finally, "no one disputes the fact that laws will be the
best ruler and judge on the issues on which it is competent." Id. 12871 § 10.
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When the citizen becomes a law to himself, State-made law is supereroga-
tory. "48 Plato affirms that doctrine many times (e.g., 405ab,
590de). But does this imply rejection of the rule of law?
That it does not is shown in the equal emphasis Plato gives law in his
discussion of education. For example, he says, "it is better for everyone,
we believe, to be subject to a power of godlike wisdom residing within
himself, or, failing that, imposed from without, in order that all of us,
being under one guidance, may be so far as possible equal and united.
This, moreover, is plainly the intention of the law in lending its support
to every member of the community, and also of the government of chil-
dren. . .. " (Cornford, 590de)." This position is similar to that of the
leading representatives of eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism.
There is, in short, no incompatibility between rigorous adherence to the
rule of law and rigorous restriction of the scope of law. The scope of
law is one thing and the value of law where it is admittedly necessary is
quite another. To assert, in effect, that Plato opposed the rule of law
because he preferred rational self-control is a non sequitur.
Our final inquiry regarding Barker's thesis leads to the heart of the
problem of the Republic, reflected in Plato's unqualified approval of the
"philosopher-king" who must not be fettered by positive law but who,
instead, in Barker's words, represents "perfect knowledge freed from
the impediment of law.""0 The required first step is to recall Sabine's
interpretation of the Republic as a "type or model" and the writer's am-
plification of that.1 If the Republic is the delineation of an ideal con-
struct while Laws is a legal treatise, we have a ready explanation for
Plato's omission in the Repnblic to bind the "philosopher-king" by posi-
tive laws. For "philosopher-king" is a symbol of perfect wisdom. It is
the principle of intelligence, not any external thing or actual person; hence
it cannot be limited by positive law. In other words, a theory of legisla-
tion is not a book of statutes.
"Legislation" includes both the theory of legislation and enactment
1 2
-knowledge of what is important and necessary for sound legislation
and the application of that knowledge in the enactment of laws. The
48. BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY 278.
49. E.g., "[1]n this matter the good are a law to themselves, and the coarser sort
of lovers ought to be restrained by force. . . ." (Syrup. 181e).
50. BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY 290. "[T]he philosophic rulers," writes
Barker, "are absolute-absolute in the sense that they are untrammelled by any written
law. Here Plato . . . comes near to the adoption of tyranny, the form of rule in which
the sovereignty of law disappeared, and a personal rule usurped its place." Id. at 205.
51. See p. 177 supra.
52. The preambles in Laws include (1) references to the principles which supply
the rational basis of the enactment and (2) exhortation to obey the law.
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drainatis personae of the dialogues symbolize this twofold process. In
Plato's scheme, the perfect ruler, the philosopher-king and the Athenian
Stranger represent God, perfect knowledge, justice, the ideal, the Good,
and, as will appear, Natural Law. And, on the other side, are more or less
imperfect human beings-the actual rulers or legislators and their subjects.
In modern terms one is apt to speak simply of the legislator's discovery
of the better solutions or the science of legislation, and of legislation.
Thus, (a) theoretical knowledge, especially of desirable ends, (b) prac-
tical restatement and adaptation of that knowledge to the immediate needs
of legislation, and (c) legislation, including constitution-making and the
drafting of codes and regulations, must be distinguished.
Some doubts regarding this interpretation may be resolved by ob-
serving Plato's use of certain words in the Republic. In an important,
typical passage, Socrates says, "you remember how, when we first began
to establish our commonwealth and several times since, we have laid
down, as a universal principle, that everyone ought to perform the one
function in the community for which his nature best suited him. Well, I
believe that that principle, or some form of it, is justice." (Cornford,
433ab). Socrates is here addressing Glaucon, but since Glaucon merely
asks occasional questions while Socrates does most of the talking, "we"
means Socrates; and "we" lay down "a universal principle" (the division
of labor) which is clearly not a positive law, but a ratio of legislation.
Thus "we" represents the "philosopher-king," the Good, the Ideal, "true
laws" or principles, God, or Nature.53 Nextly, "ruler," used in the singu-
lar, is equivalent to "we"; it, too, means reason, true law, the Ideal, the
philosopher-king. But when used in the plural, "rulers" means officials
who are actual human beings; and though they may be very wise men,
they are more or less imperfect. They are certainly not philosopher-kings."
Plato says "all are agreed that reason should be ruler." (Cornford, 442d).
But positive legal duties are to be imposed on rulers,55 e.g., "the judging
of lawsuits is a duty that you will lay upon your Rulers, isn't it?" (Corn-
ford, 433e). Plato also planned to subject "the noblest natures" to com-
pulsory education followed by required public service. (Cornford, 519cd.
53. Cf. "[W]e can admit into our commonwealth only the poetry which celebrates
the praises of the gods and of good men!' (Cornford, 607a). "We shall have to prohibit
such poems and tales and tell them to compose others in the contrary sense. Don't you
think so?" (Cornford, 392b). "I entirely agree with your principles, he said, and I
would have them observed as laws." (Cornford, 383c).
54. An important passage definitely shows that "we" and rulers are quite different
persons: "Now, said I, can we devise something in the way of those convenient fictions
we spoke of earlier, a single bold flight of invention, which we may induce the com-
munity in general, and if possible the Rulers themselves, to accept?" (Cornford, 414bc).
55. See Rep. 458c.
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Cf. 423c and 534d). These passages provide additional evidence that
Plato did not intend to leave the rulers of any actual state "unfettered
by law." 6
To summarize: (1) Plato's criticism of courts and litigants, (2) the
omission of legislation, (3) his preference for self-rule by educated per-
sons, (4) the philosopher-king's freedom from legal control, (5) the
meaning of certain key terms, and, of course, (6) the passages in praise
of positive law do not support the thesis that in the Republic Plato re-
jected the rule of law."
Statesman
Written (ca. 360) some years after the Republic (ca. 380-370)
and not long before Laws (ca. 355-348), the Statesmn represents the
transition from the zenith of Plato's most creative period to the practi-
cality of his declining years. Although Plato had not rebelled against
the rule of law in the Republic and certainly did not reject it, he had
made it clear that self-rule, the practical expression of wisdom, is better
than any external control. This insight prepared Plato for the great dis-
covery of the Statesman regarding a basic limitation of positive law-
the limitation inherent in the generality of law (29 5a). Plato's theory,
representing the first formulation of a perennial problem of political
science and jurisprudence,"8 became Aristotle's "aequitas," an essential
concept of Roman law and of modern legal systems.
Barker insists that "in the Politicus [Statesman] law is still regarded
as an evil.. .,, ; but he mitigates this judgment by admitting that
"above all a new attitude to law-still hostile, but much less uncompro-
56. Cf. "The rulers of his Republic . . . have won their place by a long novitiate
of unswerving obedience to law. . . . One of the chief criteria in the election of the
guardians is their life-long obedience to law." Shorey, Plato's "Laws" and the Unity
of Plato's Thought, IX CLASS. PHILOL. 345, 357, 358 (1914).
57. That Plato held laws "necessary without doubt" but left the provision of them
to citizens loyal to the fundamental constitution traced in the Republic, see DARESTE, LA
SCIENCE DU DROIT EN GRACE 18 (1893). See also BURLE, NOTION DE DROIT NATUREL
DANS L'ANTIQUIT GRkCQUE 311 (1908), who, however, thinks Plato preferred the power
of enlightened officials to the authority of the laws. Id. at 316. Hildenbrand thought
that in the Republic Plato was interested only in setting up a constitution, not in the legal
order of his State. I GESCHICHTE UND SYSTEM DER RECHTS-UND STAATSPHILOSOPHIE
(1860).
58. "Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental one
of rule and discretion, of administration of justice by law and administration of justice
by the more or less trained intuition of experienced magistrates." POUND, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PHILOSOPHY oF LAW 111 (1922).
59. BARKER, GREEK POLITIcAL THEORY 278.
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misingly hostile-is one of its prominent features. ' o Some explanation
of this estimate of Plato's attitude would seem to be all the more required
because, unlike his discourse in the Republic or, indeed, in any other dia-
logue, Plato does make very disparaging remarks about law in the States-
man. There is, for example, that famous passage in which Plato com-
pares law to "an obstinate and ignorant tyrant, who will not allow anything
to be done contrary to his appointment, or any question to be asked. .... "
(294bc), which alone persuaded some commentators that Plato abhorred
law. Of course, it is easy to set against such passages others in which
law is highly prai.ed. For example, it is suggested that "ruling without
laws . . . has a harsh sound" (293e) ; and "no citizen should do any-
thing contrary to the laws. . . ." (297c). But any such dipping of
passages from their contexts does not solve the problem; it only indicates
its complexity.
If the relevant passages in Statesman are examined (293-306), it is
clear that Plato espouses a "true form of government" guided by political
science, the "royal power"; hence, he argues, such a government must be
composed of a very few persons, qualified to rule "on some scientific
principle." This is his ultimate norm and axiom; all other standards are
subordinated to it, including "whether they rule according to law or with-
out law." (293c). But it is equally important to observe that his inter-
rogator immediately demurred because "ruling without laws . . . has a
harsh sound." (293e). Plato, granting that "legislation is in a manner
the business of a king," insists that "the best thing of all is not that the
law should rule, but that a man should rule supposing him to have wisdom
and royal power." (294a). There is no escape from the fact that "the
law does not perfectly comprehend what is noblest and most just for all
and therefore cannot enforce what is best. The differences of men and
actions, and the endless irregular movements of human things, do not
admit of any universal and simple rule. And no art whatsoever can lay
down a rule which will last for all time." (294ab).
Plato then confronts the crucial question: "[I] f the law is not the
perfection of right, [note that this is far from implying that it is an evil]
why are we compelled to make laws at all?" (294c). The answer is-
necessity. It is impossible for any legislator "to provide exactly what is
suitable for each particular case . . . . for how can he sit at every man's
60. Id. at 271. At least once Barker acknowledged the difficulty of his position:
"Yet if there is change, there is also consistency. The two ideals [philosopher-king and
guardian of the law] are not opposites: they are complements." Id. at 295. This recog-
nition is, however, merely an after-thought in Barker's analysis and it is patently op-
posed to his general thesis.
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side all through his life, prescribing for him the exact particulars of his
duty?" (295ab).
Although Plato holds that positive law cannot be perfect, he never
says, like Bentham, that law is an evil. On the contrary, he insists that,
so far as it goes, law, founded on science, is good, useful, and necessary.
And he returns, after having carried his scientific axiom to its logical
end, to his approval of law as "very right and good when regarded as the
second best thing, if you set aside the first, of which I was just now
speaking." (297cd). The surface inconsistencies dissolve in Plato's in-
sistence that the best actual state is always a Rechsstaat. He supports this
by emphasizing the practical limitations of his axiom, the difficulties in
the way of putting political science into actual operation. Thus he severely
criticizes the malevolent physician who puts his patient "out of the way"
and the unscrupulous pilots who "are guilty of numberless evil deeds."
In the same class is the official who exercises "absolute control." (298b).
Then follows the passage which, itself, makes it abundantly clear that
the Statesman preferred the rule of law to any other kind of government:
"To go against the laws, which are based upon long experience, and the
wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and per-
suaded the multitude to pass them, would be a far greater and more ruin-
ous error than any adherence to written law?" (300b). This implies
that "the nearest approach which these lower forms of government can
ever make to the true government of the one scientific ruler, is to do
nothing contrary to their own written laws and national customs ....
as the State is not like a beehive, and has no natural head who is at once
recognized to be the superior both in body and in mind, mankind are
obliged to meet and make laws, and endeavour to approach as nearly as
they can to the true form of government." (300e-301a, 301e).
In Plato's classification of existing states, the principal criterion is
not political science but the rule of law (and the number of rulers).
(302e). Thus, among actual states, Plato holds that monarchy "when
bound by good prescriptions or laws, is the best of all the six," and law-
less tyranny is the worst. (Id). But, immediately, Plato again holds up
the ideal of the "true Statesman," who "will do many things within his
own sphere of action by his art without regard to the laws. . . ." (300cd).
It should now be clear that such passages cannot be interpreted as anti-
legalism.61 To do that reveals a failure to apprehend Plato's distinction
61. "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great dif-
ficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and
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between perfection and any actual institution which necessarily falls short
of it.
0 2
In view of the fact that Barker's thesis rests, in part, on alleged bio-
graphical data (Plato's disappointing political experience, his conserva-
tism and willingness to compromise in old age), it is pertinent to add the
evidence of the Seventh Letter."3 There, writing of his disciple, Dion,
Plato states that if he had retained political power "he would next have ar-
rayed the citizens, so far as he was able, with laws that were suitable and
best." (Seventh Letter 336a). He repeatedly and vigorously urges that
victors in war should themselves obey the laws they establish (337a) ;
indeed "everything depends upon this: if the victors show themselves
more ready than the vanquished to submit to the laws, there will be every
hope of salvation and happiness . . .otherwise do not invite me or any-
one else to help in dealing with him who does not agree to what I have
now prescribed." (337d).
Laws
To complete the analysis of the Republic and the problems discussed
above, Plato's last, and in many ways his greatest, dialogue, Laws, must
be considered. Aristotle observed that "in the Laws there is hardly any-
thing but laws.""4 And Taylor, characterizing Laws as "severely prac-
tical," describes the custom of providing Greek colonies with codes of law
and the service of the Academy in filling this need. "Hence," he writes,
"it was eminently desirable that men contemplating the probability of
being called on to 'legislate,' should be provided with an example of the
way in which the work should be gone about, and the Laws is meant to
furnish just such an example." Plato, himself, was invited to draft
legal codes, and it seems that the Academy and its students contributed
much to legal codification."0 But much more than the draft of a legal
code is presented in Laws.
The practical objective of Laws-to provide a code of laws for a
planned colony-is announced at the outset. That Laws is directed to-
in the next place, oblige it to control itself." THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 323 (Lodge
ed. 1904) (Hamilton).
62. For a similar interpretation of Statesman, see Field, Plato's Political Thought
and its Value Today, XVI PHILOS. 240 (1941).
63. Seventh Letter, in BLucKc, PLATO'S LIFE AND THouGHET 169 (1949). See
also Ep. VIII 354c, 355e.
64. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1265a (Jowett transl. 1921). Barker's translation of Aris-
totle's text is: "The great bulk of the Laws is concerned with legislation." POLITICS OF
ARISTOTLE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1265a § 4. Cf. Jowett, "As Aristotle says in the
Politics, 'The greater part consists of laws.'" Plato's Dialogues V, xiv (3rd ed.).
65. TAYLOR, PLATO, THE MAN AND His WORK 463, 464 (1936).
66. I BUENET, GREEKc PHILOsOPHY 219, 224 (1914).
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wards the organization of an actual state is further indicated in Book
Four, where questions of the physical environment, location, and eco-
nomic resources of the colony are discussed in detail. It is also noteworthy
that the introductory books of Laws are on an intermediate level of
abstraction, lying between theory (e.g., Republic and Theaetetus) and
practical application (the legal code of the Laws). Thus, the discussion
of pleasure and good in Book Two is not an analysis of principles. It is
assumed that pleasure and good are different and that the good ought
to be pursued (as was established, e.g., in Gorgias and Republic). The
remarks in Book Three point to that as already proved, and go on to
formulate a practical guide for legislators, for example, the cultivation of
self-control by subjecting citizens to the temptations of pleasure.
When we turn to the "greater bulk" of the Laws, it is immediately
evident that the discussion differs markedly from that of the Republic.
From 774 of Book Six to 960 (the middle of Book Twelve) the dis-
course is mostly concerned with specific legislation. It is this part of
Laws which has suggested the common observation that the dialogue is a
"code of law." But it is certainly not a code in the modern sense. There
are, to be sure, many specific rules of law, both substantive and proced-
ural. At 774a, e.g., is a law penalizing bachelors older than 35 and speci-
fying the levy of annual fines. A similarly graduated scale penalizes the
expenditure of more than fixed sums for marriage garments. Divorce
is permissible after ten years of childless marriage (784b). Compen-
satory and punitive damages must be paid for removal of landmarks
(843b). For taking possession of a neighbor's swarm of bees, for care-
lessly firing one's wood so as to endanger a neighbor's property (843de),
and for diversion of water, compensation, injunction, and punitive dam-
ages are likewise provided (844cd). Fines for premature gathering of
grapes are specified, and slaves who commit such an act shall be beaten
(844e-845a). Book Nine concerns the more serious crimes: The robber
of temples ("the greatest of crimes") shall be executed (854e) ; thieves
must pay double the amount stolen (8 57a) ; insane persons are liable in
damages for their torts, but they are not to be punished (864de) ; homi-
cides are classified on lines that are still observed in modern criminal law,
and the penalties are similarly graduated (867c-869e). The proposed
legislation ends with regulation of expenditures for funerals (959d).
Although there are a goodly number of such legal rules in Laws,
they comprise, in all, but a small portion of the dialogue. An additional
part of the text might be placed in what is now called the "general part"
of legal codes, e.g., the provisions concerning insanity, drunkenness, and
PLATO'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
criminal attempts. Many regulations are formulated, and a bureaucracy
is established with detailed directions regarding administration." Pro-
cedural rules to govern trials and hearings are also included. Much of
the text consists of commentaries and preambles which recite the rationale
of the laws, and there are many exhortations to obey the laws and much
emphasis on rewards and honors, which find no place in modern legal
systems. Many privileges are set forth, demarking areas that are to be
left free from legal control.
What, in sum, this portion of Laws incompletely comprises is (1) a
rough draft of a constitution creating offices and imposing legal duties,
(2) a partial code of substantive civil and criminal law, (3) administra-
tive regulations, (4) rules of procedure, (5) doctrines, and (6) a treatise
on the proposed laws. It is in this critical explication of laws that the
"Athenian Stranger" sometimes repeats principles which Socrates an-
alyzed in the Republic. The theory of legislation expounded in the Re-
public is restated in practical terms. The gist of it is that the legislator's
function is to educate the citizens by persuading or coercing them to live
a good life. This requires the legislator, first, to Understand the relevant
empirical and moral knowledge. Secondly, the legislator must look from
the model to the clay; he must use his knowledge in drafting laws to
direct the conduct of the citizens towards right ends. Finally, it should be
added that the legislator is himself a member of the political community;
unlike the "philosopher-king," he is only an erring mortal, subjected to
law like other citizens.6"
Legislation is the heart of Plato's practical philosophy. It is ex-
pressed in his repeated identification of the purpose of legislation with
that of gymnastics, and his contrasting these with the judicial process and
the practice of medicine. Medicine is, for him, a practical science used to
restore the balance of health, whereas gymnastics habituates the body to
the development and maintenance of health. Only when that is disturbed
is the physician summoned. So, too, legislation disciplines human nature
and habituates it to a rational integration of the components of the soul-
the condition of justice. Only when the dominance of reason is upset by
67. Book Six, Laws, virtually comprises a treatise on administration. In addition
to magistrates of various sorts, including guardians or curators of the laws, there are to
be superintendents, treasurers and wardens, e.g., of streets, houses, harbors, the market-
place, religious shrines and temples. The minister of education is among the highest
officials. The provisions regarding adulteration of any goods, including those for in-
spection, investigation ["The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall
obtain information from experienced persons about the rogueries and adulterations of
the sellers. . . . " (917e)], regulation, and publication of the rules are a fair index of
Plato's thinking on this phase of government.
68. See FOSTER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF PLATO AND HEGEL 17-18 (1935).
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ignorance or passion is recourse to the law-courts necessary. Coercive
sanctions are used just as doctors administer bitter drugs. In short, legis-
lation is a constructive, educational process, implementing the ideal pat-
tern, whereas adjudication is only remedial.
Plato's Statesman, also distinguishing legislation from adjudication,
limited amendment and divergence to the former. Judging, he held, was
not an exercise of "the royal power" ;" therefore the judges, that is, the
laymen Plato despised, must adhere strictly to existing law." This elim-
inates from the scope of Plato's axiom on the primacy of political science
all the discretion in the area that is paramount in the modern tradition
of rule of law, namely litigated cases. Plato's uniform position regarding
positive law is shown in Laws, where he often reaffirms his preference
for rational self-control and also emphasizes the necessity of law in any
actual state."
It was in connection with the problem of sanctions that Plato con-
sidered the judicial process. In the context of his proposed enactments
on assault and battery (875d-876a), after specifying variations in kinds
of wounds, by whom and on whom inflicted, where, how, and when, he
argues that the individual differences in fact and harms committed are
too great for detailed legislative prescription of the sanctions. "[S]ome-
thing must be left to the discretion of the courts, but not everything;
there are things which the law must itself regulate." (Taylor, 87 6a).
The principle for determination of the respective allocation of functions
between legislature and judiciary (i.e., rule and discretion) is the compe-
tence of the courts (that of the legislator is assumed). Where courts are
incompetent the legislator "is compelled to restrict the court's discretion
to assess penalties to cases of the most insignificant kind and to do most
of the work himself by express statute ... " (Taylor, 876b). But if
judges are competent it is "entirely right and fitting that such courts
69. "Does he do anything but decide the dealings of men with one another to be
just or unjust in accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legis-
lator,-showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or
fears, or pity, or by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with
one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator?" (States. 305b). See also
Apol. 35c.
70. Plato did not even envisage a judiciary or a profession of judges. Morrow,
Plato and the Rule of Law, L PHILos. REV. 105, 124 (1941).
71. See Laws 875cd; 698ab; "justice according to law" 871c; "he who is most obe-
dient to the laws of the state, he shall win the palm [ie., of office]. . . ." 715c; "for
that state in which the law is subject and has no authority, I perceive to be on the high-
way to ruin; but I see that the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers
are the inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the Gods can con-
fer." 715cd. Taylor's translation (1934) of the last clause is: "where it [law] is
sovereign over the authorities and they its humble servants. .. ."
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should be allowed a wide discretion in assessing the fines or other penal-
ties of offenders." (Taylor, 876c). Even then, however, Plato insists
that the judges are bound to act within the law and "samples of penalties
should be set before the judges as a model to keep them from an infringe-
ment of the bounds of right." (Taylor, 876e).
The crux of the more difficult question concerning the interrelations
of the Republic and Laws lies in the meaning of Plato's "best" and "sec-
ond best" states. If he is talking in the same level of discourse in both
dialogues, if he is comparing the same kind of object (e.g., two political
states), there is no escaping the conclusion that Plato either opposed rea-
son to positive law or that he took an inconsistent position in regard to
them. I have tried to show that Plato did neither of these. The first step
toward solution of this important problem is recognition of the fact that
Plato, when he wrote the Republic and Laws, was thinking in two distinct,
but compatible levels: the ideal and the actual. What is the relation of
the one to the other in Plato's theory? The ideal and the actual are not
in the same sphere of discourse, and they therefore cannot be contradic-
tory. Nor can it be maintained that the twain shall never meet. For we
have seen in the Republic that we cannot dispose of the difficulties of
interpretation by dismissing Plato's ideal as irrelevant to existing political
communities.
That the relation of the Republic to Laws is not a simple one of ideal
to fact is clearly shown in many passages in Laws which indicate that its
state actually embodies many ideals. The Spartan organization for war is
rejected because it was directed toward "the least part of virtue" (631a) ;
instead, the laws of the planned state must be made "for the sake of the
best" (628c) and with "regard to the greatest virtue." (630bc). There
is the exclusion of seafaring trade (704e-705a) to prevent contact with
trouble-making merchants and foreigners; the insistence on a population
of 5040 citizens-the correct number for a just distribution of the land
and for self-defense; the prohibition of dowries and interest on loans
(742bc) ; and the subordination of the accumulation of wealth to higher
values. (Id). Finally, in the provision for a "divine assembly" (969b),
there is explicit reiteration of the proposal in the Republic. In sum, while
the Republic is the ideal, Laws presents an actual state which exhibits a
partial realization of the ideal.
Stated in terms of later jurisprudence-in a perfect society everyone
understands and conforms to the Natural Law. Since the Republic is an
ideal state, all citizens are perfect. They are at least the equals of those
wise persons whom Plato often characterizes as able to rule themselves.
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For these persons, positive laws are not only unnecessary, it would be
superfluous, indeed, indefensible, to attempt to subject them to such laws.
Accordingly, Plato's omission in the Republic to pay much attention to
positive laws is not the slightest evidence of the repudiation of the sover-
eignty of law.
The Ideal State of the Republic (true law, perfect wisdom) is best
"ultimately" or "absolutely." Any actual state is "second best" only
when compared with the ultimate or absolute ideal. Among actual states,
the "second best" is the best. And, without doubt, the best actual state is
always and necessarily a Rechtsstaat. To describe it as "second best" is
merely to assert that it is not perfect. But far from being opposed to the
Ideal State, the "second best" state more than any other actual state
achieves the Ideal. For reason is not opposed to sound positive law; on
the contrary, such law embodies reason, though it does so imperfectly.
Plato holds quite consistently that the rule of law is the best means to-
ward, indeed, the essential condition of, the actualization of values. There
can, therefore, be no conflict between the Republic and Laws, but only a
gap between them; and there was no change in Plato's position.1
2
It may be suggested, finally, that two major difficulties have been
responsible for questionable interpretations of Plato's legal-political phil-
osophy. The first is reading Plato from the viewpoint, or under the
influence, of legal positivism, which is evident, for example, in Barker's
opposition of reason and law. This has even led to attributing that re-
strictive view of law to Plato, e.g., Mcllwain refers to Plato's position in
terms of "the straight-jacket of the law.""3 We have seen how ill-founded
is such an interpretation of Plato's theory of law. Plato was anything
but a legal positivist, and to read his philosophy in terms of the positivist
dichotomy is simply to impose an alien theory on him.
The other principal difficulty has resulted from the assumption that
the Republic and Laws are autonomous and independent works present-
ing two "states." Even Sabine, when he comes to consider the relation of
the Republic to Laws, asserts that "the theory of the state contained in
the Republic must be regarded as having made a false start."74 Although
he recognized that the Republic represents an "ideal state," no consistent
use of that insight was made to relate that dialogue to Laws. The stum-
72. Cf. "[A]bandoning the State of pure Justice with its 'perfect Guardians,' he ad-
vocates the law-state with its Guardians of the Law." BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY
117. See also III JAEGER, PAIDEIA 214, 336 n. 6, 337 n. 9.
73. MCJLWAIN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 27.
74. SABINE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 85. Cf. SHOREY, THE IDEA OF THE GOOD IN
PLATO'S REPUBLIC (1895).
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bling block was that Plato excluded positive law from the Republic.
Sabine felt constrained to criticize Plato on that account because "the law
contains . . . an accumulation of the results of applying intelligence to
concrete cases and also an ideal of equitable treatment of like cases."7"
This defense of law against a non-existent opposition to it is both irrele-
vant and misleading. More serious yet, it raises a major obstacle to the
sound interrelation of the Republic and Laws. Plato's enduring interest
was the best possible actual state and, accordingly, a consistent inter-
pretation of both dialogues is attainable. Thus, the Republic may be
viewed as the first part of a treatise which includes Laws."8 The former
represents the ultimate ideal, the distant, ever-beckoning goal. Laws is
a half-way house, an actual point in a never-ending effort to attain per-
fection.
The problems which Plato discussed in these legal-political dialogues
comprise the major issues of modern social science. I refer particularly
to the polemics regarding the place of values in the social disciplines and
to the relevant questions of theory and research which confront modern
scholars. Plato contributed greatly to the solution of these problems,
most notably, perhaps, in his presentation of social facts as normative.
This is the meaning of Laws when that dialogue is viewed in relation to
the Republic. Any actual state can be understood only when it is recog-
nized as normative fact, as on-going processes which embody ideal ele-
ments and are also directed toward their greater realization. This applies
to the subject matter of all the social disciplines.
For example, consider the recent debates on the Is and Ought of
positive law. The polemics were confused by failure to define the prob-
lems precisely, e.g., the defintion of law, so that it was left uncertain
whether one was discussing legal ideas or actual processes. Plato's dia-
lectical method would have resolved the frustrating ambiguities. His
analysis also discloses that the problem concerning the Is and Ought of
law includes two principal questions: the nature of law viewed as func-
tional or institutional, and the criticism of law. Plato's implied answer
to questions concerning the first problem has been stated-such law is a
normative fact. It is an actuality that is, in part, ideal. It includes ends
already realized and continuing efforts to incorporate those values more
fully, as well as to achieve other ideals. What needs emphasis is that the
normative aspect of laws (or of any other social facts) does not preclude
description of them. It determines the kind of description that is most
75. SABINE, op. cit. supra note 29, at 65; see also 68.
76. To this effect see HILDENBRAND, op. cit. supra note 57, at 201.
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significant, in contrast to descriptions of physical processes. The most
significant, though not sufficient, description of a social fact like law is
a description of the represented efforts to attain certain ends and of the
partial realization of them. That is the Is of law. It is description of
actual goal-seeking and goal-realization.
Secondly, criticism of law means evaluating the relevant normative
facts in relation to a standard.7 7 The Ought of law, understood in terms
of such criticism of law, implies the possibility of fuller realization of the
accepted ends, or that better goals can and should be sought. Criticism
in terms of Ought sets against the accepted goals, other, better goals,
and against present efforts, greater ones. Thus both in defining impor-
tant problems of social research and in his suggestiveness regarding their
solution, Plato made very important contributions.
THE AMPLITUDE OF PLATO'S PHILOSOPY OF LAW
Discussions of Plato's philosophy of law are apt to exhibit consider-
able oversimplification. Plato said many things about law. The tendency
to generalize may be checked if the various contexts of his discourse are
held in view. Accordingly, it can be shown that Plato's discussions of
positive law are expressions of four perspectives-the evaluative, ideo-
logical, practical, and scientific. These are often difficult to separate.
For example, when Socrates in the Apology spoke of the "command" of
the Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leon of Salamis as a specimen of that
"oppressive power," he was both evaluating their power norms and in-
dulging in ideology.
The evaluative perspective, free of involvement in ideology, is clear-
est in critical analysis and in conversation with friends who represent
different points of view. The probing of grounds of policy and the
search for desirable ends, conducted dispassionately and critically, are the
earmarks of objective evaluation of law; and this is frequently Plato's
perspective. The ideological perspective"8 is prominent in sharp debates
on political obligation, where one is apt to characterize rules for the pur-
pose of winning an argument, or in bitter opposition to a government, as
when Antigone contrasted the law of Zeus with the mere "decrees" of
77. "We are enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of
the perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might have an
ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own happiness and
unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and the degree in which we
resembled'them .... ." (Rep. 472cd). This problem is more fully discussed in HALL,
THEFT, LAW AND SocIETY, Introduction (2nd ed. 1952).
78. The ideological perspective may, of course, be regarded as simply unsound
evaluation.
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the rulers."0 The third perspective is the practical one of the potential
litigant. Here one is interested in the formal aspect of rules, in the com-
mands of the state, in "lawyer's law." Finally, there are some passages
where Plato looks at law from a scientific perspective. He is apt here,
also, to evaluate the norms under inspection, but his purpose goes beyond
that, extending to considerations that are important in political-legal
science, analytical and empirical.
The formal phase of Plato's science of law is quickly discovered:
Plato clearly recognized that aspect of law as a normative proposition
and, also, its enforcement by "the ruling power in each state." (Rep.
338d). To the illustrations, noted elsewhere by the writer,0 may be added
many of Plato's proposed enactments in Laws, which are expressed in the
form of conditional judgments, joining a described set of circumstances
to a sanction by use of the verb "shall" or "must" or an equivalent.8"
His awareness of the structure of laws is indicated in his formula: "Do
this, avoid that-and then holding the penalty in terrorem. . . ." (Laws
719e). He often uses the word "prescribe" (Rep. 525b) and writes of
the legislator's "command, that is to say the law." (Laws 723a). The
sanctions include a large array of "evils," but they occasionally specify
the grant of rewards (Laws 834a), though' this, like "praise [of those]
• . .obedient to the law" (Laws 775b, 921e), is usually not part of the
rule itself, but is an extra-legal sanction.
It is true that Plato did not construct a system of basic legal con-
ceptions, and the dialogues include nothing like the detailed analysis of
Austin or Hohfeld. But almost all the notions employed by those writers
are found in Plato, such as, correlatives (Rep. 478c; "two correlative
terms, if one is qualified, the other must always be qualified too. .. "
Cornford, 438b); opposites and "pairs of opposites,"82 and privilege
("they alone shall be free . . . but the rest of the world shall not have
this liberty").s He employed the term "hurt" to mean legally forbidden
harm (Laws 861e), and the concepts of contract, crime, intention, negli-
gence, accident, fraud and coercion, necessity, voluntary and involuntary,
as well as many specific legal harms, are discussed. But it would be
79. Sophocles, Antigone, 450-460. That the distinction between laws and decrees
was current among the Greeks, see PERROT, op. cit. supra note 45.
80. HALL, LIVING LAW OF DEmocRATIc SociETY 19-20 (1949). For discussion of
the thesis that the Greeks anticipated modern Legal Positivism see Professor Calhoun's
essay summarized therein.
81. Plato even made the required procedure part of the circumstance clause: "And
if any one disobeys this regulation, and is brought into court and convicted, he shall be
punished with death, and his property shall be confiscated." (Laws 915c).
82. Phaedo 71a, 71c; Laws 901a.
83. Laws 829d. Cf. Rep. 389b.
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difficult to establish definite, historical connections between Plato and
the modern legal positivists. 4
The polemics of Platonists and Aristotelians and the modem pre-
occupation with facts have combined to obscure Plato's importance in the
history of science, including that of law and politics. Yet Plato's life-long
quest for the "one in the many" represents the most characteristic and
enduring feature of the scientific mind. Although it is true that Aris-
totle engaged in much more factual investigation than his teacher, Plato
did not lack interest in empirical research."5 He was certainly concerned
with empirical political science, for example, his interest in the origin of
the political community. He was among the first to hold that patriarchal
rule was the primitive form of government. In the pre-literate era, he
suggested, there were no lawgivers in the Greek sense but rather the first
families "lived by habit and the customs of their ancestors .... ,,s6 Any
association, he held, could legislate for its own members, and the statutes
would be recognized by the state so far as they were not in conflict with
its laws.87 This is significant with regard to an important theory of
modern legal sociology concerning the law of sub-groups.
The search for valid empirical generalizations was directed per-
sistently. Plato wanted to study many political communities over a long
period of time "and observe the changes which take place in them.
(Laws 676a). He emphasized "the cause of these changes; for that will
probably explain the first origin and development of forms of govern-
ment." (Laws 676c). He sought not only to "analyze the causes of their
[statesmen and legislators] failure" but also to "find out what else might
have been done." (Laws 693ab).
In formulating these inquiries he entertained many hypotheses as
instruments of scientific method. Social research was to be guided by
such generalizations as the effect of a "spirit of license" upon manners
and customs, thence on contracts, and finally on "laws and constitutions"
(Rep. 424de), and "that the plays of childhood have a great deal to do
with the permanence or want of permanence in legislation." (Laws 797a).
An instance of a more precise hypothesis is that "when modes of music
change, the fundamental laws of the State always change with them."
(Rep. 424c). It is noteworthy that Plato's investigations were to be
84. The connecting link would, of course, be Roman law and jurisprudence; Austin
studied these subjects in Germany. But it is a moot question whether the Romans were
directly influenced by Greek philosophy, e.g., via Cicero, or whether, like the English
common law judges, they developed their law without benefit of philosophy.
85. FIELD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO (1949).
86. Laws 680ab. Cf. MACIVER, SOCIETY: A TEXTBOOK OF SOCIOLOGY 332-33 (1937).
87. Wilamowitz, quoted by BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY 43 & n.3.
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projected from both the viewpoint of social control, i.e., that of the
manipulator, and also, as just indicated, from the viewpoint of the objec-
tive researcher, the scientific observer. Plato's interest in the former was
expressed in terms of "the art of rearing man collectively" (States. 267d)
and "the management and control of living beings" (States. 261d) ; and
he thought a tyrant "can change the manners of a state." (Laws' 71 lb).
But it is the other side of Plato's social science, revealed in his dis-
cussion of the conditions of political community (Laws 709de) and of
the interactions of law with environment, physical and social, that is
especially significant. For example, in Laws, the Spartan defends his
institutions by reference to "the character" of his country (Laws 625cd).
Plato develops the idea, suggesting "that man never legislates, but acci-
dents of all sorts legislate for us in all sorts of. ways." War and poverty
"are constantly overturning governments and changing laws." So too,
disease, pestilence, and bad seasons affect law and government (Laws
709a). Related to this attitude toward the political process is Plato's
thesis that legislation must be adapted to many kinds of conditions, in-
cluding even "diverse winds and violent heats," water, and the food which
affects both body and personality. "To all these matters the legislator, if
he have any sense in him, will attend as far as man can, and frame his
laws accordingly." (Laws 747e). Plato's scientific interest was also ex-
pressed in practical proposals, e.g., to appoint official social scientists,
"spectators," who were to travel abroad and report periodically on any
possible improvements in law and government suggested by their inves-
tigations."8
These contributions to a science of law and politics, and Plato's
familiarity with various types of "authoritative materials" must be taken
into account in determining his use of the term "law." The most impor-
tant question in this regard concerns the thesis that Plato held value to
be an essential element of positive law, that there is no such thing as
"an unjust law."
Certain passages seem to support this thesis, e.g., (1) "right reason,
which the law affirms" (Laws 659cd) ; (2) "meaning by the very term
'law' the distribution of mind" (Laws 7 14a); (3) "virtue and justice
and institutions and laws being the best things among men" (Crito 5 3c) ;
(4) "the beauty of institutions and laws" (Syrup. 210c) ; and (5) "the
sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common [public] law
88. Especially were they to report "about kinds of knowledge which may appear to
be of use . . . or of which the want will make the subject of laws dark and un-
certain. . . " (Laws 95 2 a).
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of the State." (Laws 645a). The contexts of these passages show that
in (1) Plato, speaking as the Athenian Stranger in Laws, is proposing
censorship of music and the theatre. In (2) the context is the perfect law
of Cronos in a mythical past. The use of "law" in that context is also
ambiguous, and Plato may have intended to identify "true law" with
positive law. In any case, he was certainly not discussing any existing
positive law. In (3) the context is a discussion of the Athenian state,
whose laws Socrates approved. The statement in (4) is from Diotima's
eulogy of Eros, and she was speaking of the education of young men so
that instead of being bound by a restrictive notion of beauty, they would
see it in many places-"the beauty of them all is of one family." In (5),
the context is the inner conflict between vice and reason, and the quoted
phrase is merely incidental to the discussion. Moreover, the Athenian
Stranger is proposing legislation for a new colony: "the State" may well
refer to that planned city, where the norms called law "by us" are quite
different from the positive laws of actual states. "[L]aws generally
should look to one thing only . . . virtue." 9
When it is clear that Plato is discussing existing positive laws, he
almost invariably evaluates them as most modern critics would. They
are good or bad, hence, we "praise and blame the laws. . . ." (Laws
770e). He criticizes Cretan laws because they were designed only for
war (Laws 705de). He speaks of "a city which has good laws" (Laws
656c), and he reserves his highest praise for "the knowledge of good
laws. . . ." (Laws 957c). At the beginning of Laws, it is admitted
that "one of us may have to censure the [existing] laws of the others
. ... " (Laws 634c). The Stranger's (i.e., Plato's) criticism is so sharp
that his interlocutor demurs (Laws 667a). In referring to certain colo-
nies, Plato comments on "the badness of their own laws." (Laws 708c).
He observes that "some laws are better and others worse" (Crat. 429b),
and he even goes so far as to assert that some "laws are . . . the destruc-
tion of cities." (Laws 683b). He criticizes "laws . . . passed for the
good of particular classes [in oligarchies] . . . States which have such
laws are not polities but parties. . . .
If we keep these and similar passages in mind we will avoid over-
89. Laws 963a. (Italics added.)
90. Laws 715b. Professor Morrow, after noting that there was "a tendency" in the
Academy to identify positive with ideal law, adds, "doubtless these Academics continued
to speak with the vulgar and to apply the term nomos also to the legal and moral rules
that were currently regarded as binding, however defective they might be from the
point of view of the ideal. Such a way of speaking would be confusing on occasion. ...
Now this confusion is present in Plato's Laws. . . ." MoRaow, Plato and the Law
of Nature, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 17, 40 (Konvitz and Murphy ed. 1948).
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simplication of Plato's philosophy of law. We will refrain from out-of-
context emphasis on sentences which have sometimes been heavily relied
upon to support the thesis that Plato's theory is identical with that of
Stoic and medieval legal philosophies.
Minos bears directly on this question, since Socrates is alleged to
have said, "an evil decree cannot be [positive] law." Here, indeed, is an
extremely valuable record of an important discussion conducted in an
atmosphere of objective inquiry. The opening sentence of the dialogue-
"What is law ?"-indicates the relevance of the discourse. But Minos
raises no problem so far as Plato's theory is concerned, because it was
not written by Plato. It is a pseudo-Platonic dialogue written about 250
B.C. and is probably of Stoic origin." It represents a new ideological
position, dictated by the political subservience of Athens and the cos-
mopolitan character of its intellectual 6lite.
There remains only Hippias Major where Socrates is alleged to have
said, "then when those who make the laws miss the good, they have
missed the lawful and the law." (284e). And the authority of Sir David
Ross has recently been added to support the genuineness of that dialogue,
although he recognizes that many scholars regard it as spurious." But
even if Hippias Major was written by Plato it must still be recognized
that the frequently quoted passages amount to mere fragments in com-
parison with the bulk of Plato's discourse on law. Is it likely that the
author of Apology, Crito, Statesman, and Laws, which, together, com-
prise almost half of his published work, would have discussed the most
fundamental of all jurisprudential issues in so casual a manner? Accord-
ingly, even if Plato did write Hippias Major, it cannot be regarded as a
radical revision of his legal-political treatises.
This does not, of course, imply that Plato was unsympathetic to the
views expressed in the Minos, much less that he did not suggest its prin-
cipal argument. The identification of law with morality was a popular
notion, a Greek tradition, formulated by Heraclitus" and harking back
to ancient myth and belief in the divine origin of positive law. It is this
belief which gave priority to law over justice, reversing the modern
standpoint and standard of evaluation. Ancient law, emanating from the
91. HEIDEL, PSEUDO-PLATONICA 15, 43 (1896). Similar is Jaeger's view. See his
Praise of Law, in INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 369 (Sayre ed.
1947). Heidel says Mios 315a "is identical in meaning with Hipp. Maj. 284d." And
"the genuineness of that dialogue is still debated." SHOREY, WHAT PLATO SAID 91
(1934). So, too, TARRANT, THE HIPPIAS MAJOR xi (1928). But cf. Ross, PLATO'S
THEORY OF IDEAS 3, 4 (1951).
92. Ross, op. cit. supra note 91.
93. I JAmER, PAIDEA 181, 184.
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gods, was, of course, perfect rule, and justice was a reflection or conse-
quence of it. This was a frequent theme of the poets and pre-Socratic
philosophers. Thus, from the very beginning, positive law embodied
value. Xenophon attributed that belief to Socrates,9" and Plato undoubt-
edly supported the tradition. But approval of a tradition is quite different
from the explication of a theory of law.
Plato's philosophy of law opposes certain modern theories, e.g., that
"law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner life of
man."9 5 This has been the chief point emphasized by many modern
writers in differentiating law and ethics. Some of them also assert that
ethical principles are autonomous while law is heteronomous, that ethics
involves only the individual while law is bilateral. Finally, 'there is the
insistence of legal positivists that ethical principles are not sanctioned
while laws are sanctioned.
The validity of these theories of law is challenged by Plato's phil-
osophy. His insistence that justice involves the "inward self" must be
set against the restrictive view that law is concerned solely with external
action. Deliberately doing a right act implies a correct inward "move-
ment" or state of mind. If the motive is bad, the plenitude of morality
is obviously lacking. But, at the same time, the mental state is surely and
significantly different from that of a person who intentionally harms
someone and from that of one who fails to do a right act. For there is
recognition of the external act as required (and also, often, as ethical)
and a voluntary movement, however reluctant, to do the act, which is
ethically significant. Only on the premise that law may require harmful
actions can the current thesis be defended. With reference to the alleged
autonomous nature of ethics, it is only necessary to refer to the thorough-
going social character of Plato's ethics to refute the notion that ethics
are not interpersonal.
Finally, Plato held that ethical principles, no less than rules of law,
are sanctioned. That violators of the "true laws," those objectively real
forms which positive laws only imperfectly express, are punished in
heaven is frequently reiterated in the dialogues, e.g., the dramatic myth
of Er details both the rewards of the good and the suffering of wrong-
doers (Rep. 614b-621d). Admittedly, there are differences as regards
the time and certainty of enforcement. But, in addition to the certain
post-mortem sanctions, there are self-imposed sanctions, social disap-
94. "Do you say, Socrates, that to be conformable to the laws, and to be just, is the
same thing?" "I do indeed." XENOPHON, MEMORABILIA, Book iv, 4, 12.
95. West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943)
(dissenting opinion).
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proval, and that "natural" compensation which transforms wrongdoers
into godless, wretched persons resembling the evil deeds they perpetrate
(Theaet. 177a). The variety of positive laws, as Plato viewed them,"
requires correspondingly different sanctions.
We may now recognize as anomalous, the strange fact that in the
Anglo-American histories of Natural Law philosophy, Plato is almost
completely ignored,"7 as, for example, in the two most influential essays
on the subject, those by Pollock and Bryce.9" The cause of this curious
neglect appears to be an accident of language, as is indicated in Pollock's
opening sentence: "The term 'Law of Nature,' or natural law, has been
in use in various applications ever since the time of the later Roman Re-
public." He notes that its "ultimate principle" is fully recognized in the
common law as "reason, reasonableness, or sometimes natural justice
. . . but the difference of terminology has tended to conceal the real
similarity from English lawyers during the last century or more."99 This
difference has also concealed the origin of Natural Law philosophy. For
when Pollock proceeds "to give a summary view of the origin and devel-
opment of the doctrine" he starts with Aristotle's famous passage in
Book Five, Ethics. There is not a word about Plato. Pollock merely
acknowledges that "the distinction was not altogether new in Aristotle's
time. '
Bryce did pay some attention to pre-Aristotelians, quoting Sophocles'
Antigone, referring to Homer, to Heraclitus' observation on divine law,
and to Xenophon's report of Socrates' comparison of positive laws with
unwritten laws that are the same in all countries.'' Bryce also recognized
that Plato has a place in the Natural Law tradition: "Similar passages,"
he said, "occur in Plato, who contrasts abstract justice and rightful laws
with the actual laws and customs that prevail in political communities."' 2
Bryce then summarizes Aristotle and the Stoics briefly, and devotes the
96. See note 43 supra. The extent to which Plato would go in sanctioning ethical
duties is shown in Laws 788 where he refrains from detailed legislation on family af-
fairs only because the wrongs are too frequent and too trivial. And it is only fear of
ridicule and wholesale violation that keeps him from legislating regarding the exercises
of pregnant women (789d-790a).
97. But see WILD, PLATO'S MODERN ENEMIES AND THE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW
(1953), and CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 29, 46 (1949).
98. POLLOcK, ESSAYS IN THE LAw 31-79 (1922); II Bryce, STUDIES IN HISTORY
AND JURISPRUDENCE 112-71 (1901). Both were apparently written at the same time,
1900, though Pollock's essay was published first. See Bryce, op. cit. supra 127-28 n. 2.
99. Pollock, op. cit. supra note 98, at 31. (Italics added.) Cf. "The term 'Natural
Law' is not Platonic. . . ." Maguire, supra note 5, at 151.
100. Pollock, op. cit. supra note 98, at 32.
101. Cf. XENOPHON, ME-ORAMILIA, Book iv, 4, 19.
102. Bryce, op. cit. supra note 98, at 125.
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bulk of his essay to the Romans. That is the account of the origin of
Natural Law philosophy which, until very recently, represented the Anglo-
American history of the subject. 0 '
The usage which long retarded the recognition of Plato's place in
the tradition of Natural Law philosophy concerns the term physis (Na-
ture). Recent philological studies.. have traced the linguistic evolution
of physis from that of the Milesian physicists to Plato's interpretation of
"Nature" as a regulative principle. The other, equally important phase
of Plato's contribution was to refute the argument that law (nomos)
was only conventional, and to show, instead, that it was natural in the
normative sense.
These are the conclusions reached, but a full exploration of the
problem would be very difficult even for specialists in Greek philology.
If our purpose required us to distinguish all the meanings of "nature,"
it would be a sufficient deterrent to note that for the ancient Greeks,
nature meant no less than "Substance, Life, Power, Soul, and God."'0 3
Many treatises have been written about each of these and they do not
exhaust the meaning of "Nature." Professor Lovejoy assures us that
"nearly all of the great catchwords have been equivocal-or rather, mul-
tivocal .... The supreme example of this is, of course, to be seen in the
most potent, pervasive, and persistent of all catchwords-'nature'.' 6
Fortunately, in the present inquiry we need concentrate only upon the dis-
tinction between physical nature and nature as a value cosmos. The trend
in ancient Greece was from a usage, confusing or, at least, not distinguish-
ing these meanings to Plato's effort to give "Nature" a normative mean-
ing, and thence to the firm acceptance of that definition of nature, among
other normative meanings of it, in Aristotle's writing. A mechanistic
view of nature had been achieved by the "physical investigators" of the
four basic elements.0 7 A related meaning is nature viewed as the source
103. Several recent essays provide important corrections to the history of natural
law philosophy, especially SOLmSEN, PLATO'S THEOLOGY 167 (1942) ; Maguire, supra note
5; MomRow, Plato and the Law of Nature, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 17. See
also, MAYER, POLITICAL THOUGHT 32 (1939); JAEGER, PAIDEIA, e.g., III, 241, and his
Praise of Law, supra note 91, at 352; HILDENBRAND, op. cit. supra note 57; and Gurvitch,
Natural Law, XI ENcYc. Soc. Sci. 286 (1933). An excellent summary is presented by
Adams, The Law of Nature in Greco-Roman Thought, XXV J. RELIG. 97 (1945). And
see WILD, op. cit. supra note 97 and CAIRNS, op. cit. supra note 97.
104. MoRRow, Plato and the Law of Nature, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 17,
42.
105. McClure, The Greek Conception of Nature, XLIII PHILOS. REV. 109, 115
(1934).
106. LovEjOY, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS XV (1948). Some 60 meanings of
"nature" are given in this book. See especially c. 5 and 16.
107. Laws 891c. There was probably always a prescriptive element included. See
JAEGER, THE THEOLOGY OF THE EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHERS 71 (1947).
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of bodily sensations (Theaet. 186b). Plato also uses "nature" to mean
original aptitude or native endowment as opposed to nurture (Rep. 423d)
and, again, as fitting or suited to the exercise of certain functions (Crat.
387a), and also as "normal" in the sense that "an animal produces after
his kind." (Crat. 393bc).
The relevant jurisprudential issue was dramatically presented in
Gorgias. It will be recalled that Callicles argued that "convention and
nature are generally at variance with one another." (Gorg. 482e ff.).
Indeed, laws are "agreements contrary to nature" (Gorg. 492c), which
the naturally superior man "would trample underfoot." (Gorg. 484a).
Xerxes and all other great conquerors acted "according to nature . . .
and according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that arti-
ficial law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows. . . ." (Gorg.
483e). For Callicles, nature was not mechanistic, and he finally admits
that the "superior," who are "the better and the wiser" (Gorg. 490a),
should rule and satisfy their desires without inhibition (Gorg. 483d,
488ab). "And this," said he, "I affirm to be natural justice.. .
(Gorg. 492a). Hippias also argued that nature is opposed to positive
law; indeed, "law is the tyrant of mankind, and often compels us to do
many things which are against nature." (Prot. 337d). That these views
were not original with Plato's opponents is evidenced in a fifth century
essay by the Sophist, Antiphon. Legal precepts, argued Antiphon, "are
adventitious, whereas those of nature are necessary." So too, rules of
law are merely agreements or conventions; "those of nature are the
product of growth." One should, therefore, always obey nature, even
when he was unobserved, while conformity to law is solely a matter of
expediency. For violation of Nature's laws is always injurious because
they rest on fact, whereas law is merely opinion.' The distinction drawn
by Antiphon between nature and convention had been applied long before
by Parmenides and others. "'
In this context the significance of Plato's revival of "the older
Greek view of nature as a moral, purposeful, rational, divine order""'
is evident. Nature is thus viewed as an ideal to which rational beings
should conform. For example, "the true ruler is not meant by nature to
regard his own interest, but that of his subjects. . . ." (Rep. 347d). So
too, the rulers of the Republic should be the most competent persons re-
gardless of their class origin and in order to assure that "nature orders a
transposition of ranks. . . ." (Rep. 415c). This implies that "a mis-
108. See BARKER, GREEK POLITICAL THEORY 66-69, 83-85.
109. JAEGER, THE THEOLOGY OF THE EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHERS 185.
110. McClure, supra note 105.
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take . . . [is] not according to nature." (Laws 686d). Thus, nature,
as the principle of reason, has priority over biological forces.111
Finally, although one does not find the specific Stoic exhortation
to live "in conformity with nature," '12 Plato's dialogues repeat Heraclitus'
aphorism and add equivalent expressions of it. Thus, in the Republic,
Plato argued that justice is "real and natural and not merely conven-
tional. . . ." (Rep. 367c). Coming closer to the subsequent usage, he
said "the individual, attaining to right reason . . . should live according
to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one
who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law. .... "
(Laws 645b). And "that the wise should lead and command . . . surely
is not contrary to nature, but according to nature ... " (Laws 690b).
In the Republic, he said "the law which we then enacted was agreeable to
nature. . . ." (Rep. 456c). In Laws, after he had challenged the still
current naturalistic meaning of phlysis (690b-d, 892bc), he uttered words
which later philosophers adopted almost verbatim-"our view of law will
be more in accordance with nature" (858c) ; and "a legislator who has
anything in him . . . ought to support the law and also art, and acknowl-
edge that both alike exist by nature, and no less than nature, if they are
the creations of mind in accordance with right reason. . . ." (890d).
At the very end of his career, Plato asked, "and may not the same be said
of all good things-that the true guardians of the laws ought to know the
truth about them, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry
them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according
to nature ?""'
The final categorical imperative is to copy the "divine pattern,""' 4
a perfect "unchangeable pattern" (Tim. 28b, 48e), an "eternal nature."
(Timn. 39d). The philosopher-king will "shape the pattern of public and
private life into conformity with his vision of the ideal. . . . [for] hap-
piness can only come to a state when its lineaments are traced by an artist
working after the divine pattern."
Thus Plato closed the circle from the affirmations of Socrates in
the Apology to the natural theology of Laws X, which lives today in the
111. "[N]ature orders the soul to rule. . . ." (Phaedo 80a).
112. Cf. "[T]he noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the
greatest wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason .
(Laws 689d).
113. Laws 966b. "[lit was but a short step from the 'natural justice' which occurs
so often in Plato's pages to 'natural law'; and thus the way was fully prepared for the
Stoic phrase." MORROW, Plato and the Law of Nature, in ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY
17, 42.
114. Theaet. 176b; Rep. 352b, 612e; Phileb. 39e; Laws 716d, 728ab.
PLATO'S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
Western religious tradition. Even though one disagrees with Plato on
many points, it is impossible to remain insensitive to the sweep of his
imagination. Centering on law and the political community, he .created
a world-picture in which every important phase of human experience
found an intelligible place in significant interrelations to all the other
major components of the cosmos. From the beginning, he saw his prob-
lems as legal-political issues, involving the legitimacy of government and
questions of political obligation.
In the early dialogues, Plato took a definite moral stand regarding
the solution of these problems, affirming it in Apology, dramatizing it in
Crito, and exploring it dialectically in Gorgias. In his maturity, the quest
led to the metaphysical foundation of ethics and to the relevance of re-
ligion. And, in his old age, he turned to the detailed application of his
theories and to the systematic development of his theology.
Plato's "master science" is especially relevant to our own problems
because of his theory of the rule of law. This, indeed everything Plato
wrote, implies that what is important for legal and political science is
thinking and the consequent valid solution of problems; hence, any dis-
cipline which assiduously avoids the rational aspect of political experience
cannot possibly suffice. An adequate political science will take full ac-
count of the intelligible side of political conduct, and that is primarily
and most definitely expressed in the legal experience of the race.1"' That
is why Plato concentrated on law.
In each step of his progress from Apology through Laws, the law
of the political community, positive law, was given paramount signifi-
cance. For Plato, it represented the socially most important act of reason
as well as abiding evidence of the order and harmony which links man
to society and both to the universal Logos. A detailed analysis of all the
dialogues would, in the writer's opinion, support the thesis that positive
law is the central thiead which unifies Plato's philosophy. That, in turn,
would raise many interesting questions. Is the legal-political perspective,
thus achieved, only one among several equally tenable world hypotheses,
or is it, in a defensible sense, more fundamental and inclusive than any
other one? The question concerns the relation of legal-political philos-
ophy to philosophy "in general," and the conclusions reached in this
essay suggest a sharp revision of accepted classifications, which would
place legal-political theory in the basic position and assign what now
115. Hall, Unification of Political and Legal Theory, 69 PoL. ScI. QUART. 15
(1954).
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passes so frequently as "philosophy" to the realm of specialities. Many
other answers to perennial problems are suggested by Plato's philosophy
of law. Here, however, emulating Plato, the writer leaves these inquiries
suspended before the imagination, inviting the return again and ever
more to the philosopher's intriguing way of life.
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